Reply to Ryan Goodman 3 of 4 - Politics behind
Politics behind
Ryan Goodman, a professor of Law of Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz at New York
University, writes the following;
"… Sri Lanka’s historic
defeat of an insurgency is emerging as a competing model to
US counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy. It is a draconian
alternative that, if adopted by other militaries, risks counterproductive and
blowback effects to the detriment of US interests."
Goodman has not paid enough attention to the significant difference between
these two models of counterterrorism operations, the US model and the Sri
Lankan model.
While the US counterterrorism operations are conducted on foreign territories
the Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation was conducted within its own
territory. These are the operations I refer to as US counterterrorism operations
– Goodman does the same.
This is a significant different. Unlike the Sri Lankan operation, I point
out, this different causes each US counterterrorism operation to maintain a
balancing act between its long term national interests and helping out foreign
sovereigns to eradicate terrorism within their territories. I call this a
perfect equilibrium. This perfect equilibrium is a condition which the US
administration tries to maintain in foreign territories.
The winning means to the US administration is maintaining that perfect equilibrium
intact.
The winning means to all the others like you and me is a total eradication
of terrorism. We expect, post counterterrorism is followed by nation-state building,
reforms, democratization, market liberalization, bestowing universal rights
upon citizen and many others will follow. For the
US administration they are just rhetoric.
In a realist point of view, it is not in the US interests to see those
things are being genuinely materialized in those territories. This is a very
simple understanding of what realist school of international relations teaches.
For anyone who wonders about what is wrong with the US counterterrorism operations
around the world today - even if the US asserts how badly they want to win the
operations - this article is a nice place to start on reflecting on inert
impossibility of winning any counterterrorism operation within a foreign
territory. Be mindful I refer to the winning with the second meaning of the wining
I outlined above.
To conduct a successful counterterrorism operation within a state, the
state has to follow certain principles in military operations. The ‘political
will’ shall be the first principle of any winning counterterrorism operation, I
argue. The Sri Lankan authority followed that principle. This article only discus
that principle.
As Goodman also admitted the victory against the LTTE was a historical
victory. And no nation as such in recent history has managed to claim such a
victory against terrorist organization.
The counterterrorism operation conducted by the Sri Lankan authority
remains a unique counterterrorism operation. The operation not only managed to
totally eradicate the terrorist elements within the country but it also has
managed to prevent any terrorist attacks occurring in the country aftermath of
it. It has been five years since the totally eradication of terrorism in the
country in May 2009. It has won the
hearts and minds of local people too. The post-war economic developments are seemingly
consolidating those.
Therefore, I argue against Goodman that the US counterterrorism model and
the Sri Lankan model are two different models. They cannot be compared.
The Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation does not emerge as a competing
model to the US counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy in that
regard.
But the Sri Lankan model remains as the only counterterrorism model
available to eradicate terrorism within a state. Goodman has gotten that wrong.
Secondly, I point out that the Sri Lankan model offers a wealth of new
perspectives to all the actors dealing with counterterrorism operations. They
may include state actors, their armies, policy researchers, academics and so on.
The must-have-tools to win a
counterterrorism operation could be learned studying the Sri Lankan experience.
Finally, I assert Goodman mingles
humanitarian law with US national interests. He advises the US Justice
Department to indict Gotabaya back to the US. He lacks enough reflections on those
issues that he is discussing. Or he is deliberately plays a dirty game with the
Sri Lankan administration and the people of Sri Lanka.
Acknowledgment
Goodman has written three articles on Sri Lanka. In reply I have already
written two articles. I have outlined some context in those two articles. Some
may find those context is supportive to read this article too. I have linked his
articles to my first article. My first article is titled, Reply to Ryan
Goodman 1 of 4 - What is this all about?. The second
article is titled, Reply to Ryan
Goodman 2 of 4 - What does Goodman leave out?. I
will address the US administration in the next article. That article will be titled Reply to Ryan
Goodman 4 of 4 - The US position on Sri Lanka. I will argue that an attempt made to indict Gotabaya to US would have
counterproductive effects to the US national interests in Sri Lanka and abroad,
especially to the US’ shifting interest of Pivot to Asia.
Very few occasions in this article I attribute the US Global War on Terror
and US counterterrorism operations as one. But there are differences in their
definitions. I have made sure this use of two concepts does not lead to any confusion.
The Difference - US Counterterrorism Model & Sri Lanka Counterterrorism Model
President
Obama states the US national interest is the first priority of any US Army
operations. These army operations include counterterrorism operations too. (Available
here, National Security Strategy in 2010)
However, the
interesting thing about the national interest of US is that there is no clear
definition to define it. That seems to go for any nation state and their nation
interests - to do justice to the US.
To understand the reason for a
lack of clear definition, I bring Peter
Trubowitz’s explanation on the political nature of nation interest.
Trubowitz writes,
‘the national
interest is defined by those societal interests who have power to work within
the political system to translate their preferences into policy’. (Trubowitz, P
(1998) Defining the
National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy.
Chicago: University Chicago Press. P.4)
This is a good place to
start understanding the political nature of national interest. If you want to read
further the changing and adopting nature of US nation interest read the article
of Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Redefining the National Interest.
Meanwhile General
Dempsey, current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
principal military adviser to Obama, has adopted the following
definition to define the ‘success’ of an counterterrorism operation, or rather the Global War on Terrorism.
SUCCESS – ‘the direct approach focuses on protecting US
interests.’
(Read: Counterterrorism: JointPublication 3-26. 13 November 2009. p.1-7)
(Read: Counterterrorism: JointPublication 3-26. 13 November 2009. p.1-7)
If you want
to fully understand how the US policy evolution is taking place in detail in
this regard - from the US national interest to the US counterterrorism strategy
- read the paragraphs under the title of ‘Prioritized
Strategic End States for the Global War on Terrorism’ in the same policy
report linked above.
Coming back to Ryan Goodman, Goodman has gravely mistaken the model US
counterterrorism operation with the Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation.
The Sri Lankan
operation remained within its borders. The US operations always remain outside
of its national borders. While this enables the Sri Lankan authority to act within
its own territory with its untainted
national interest to eradicate terrorism, the US administration either has to help
or go against a foreign sovereign to secure the condition needed for the US to
eradicate terrorism within that sovereign. Furthermore, at the same time, the
US has to secure its long-term national interests intact in that foreign territory.
This is the fundamental difference between those two models of operations. The
US has to balance out how much it helps another sovereign to eradicate terrorist
elements against its own nation interest. This is the case regardless if the operation
is carried out with or without the consent of the hosting state. For the US the
dilemma remains.
Ideally, at an attempt to eradicate terrorist elements within a country, the
US has to commit itself to provide all the necessary resources needed to do so
to that country. Only that will secure the long-term conditions necessary. The US counterterrorism manuals also say that.
However, that means the US has to stay in those countries for a generation
or two with their purest intentions and enough resources. We have witnessed this
today in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.
If ever the US does that, what would be the eventual consequence? The
eventual consequence would be the emergence of a prosperous sovereign state. I
would argue the total eradication of domestic rivalries for good would lead
that country to become the latter.
What does that mean to be a sovereign state? It means, among many other
things, as a nation-state it knows and it is capable of securing its own nation
interest. Will the US want that?
If you ever think the US wishes to see that kind of nation-states around,
as the super power today, you have gotten one simple principle of international
relations wrong. It is the principle of national interest.
But then again you are not alone with that belief. Most of the liberal international
theorists and those who profess more cooperation in the context
counterterrorism operations it seems genuinely believe so.
In my understanding it is not in the interest of US national interest to secure
those conditions – however the US counterterrorism manuals keep stipulating
that is the case - in any state. It is against the US national interest. That
is the bottom line.
You could now understand what the US means by a successful US
counterterrorism operation. It means a totally different thing to the US – maintain
of a perfect equilibrium. But we have been lead to believe success means
success.
The success to the US means things like followings, oil fields are being
secured, navigating waters and airspaces are being secured, the US business
interests are citizens are being secured, and embassies are being secured in
those countries.
Those who argue the universal values do also mean something to the US, look
around before you make that argument.
In the second sense of success - that means the real success to me and you
- happens when a US counterterrorism operation went wrong, which they always do.
The complex dynamics surround any
counterterrorism operation could easily till the outcome against the US interests.
That happens all the time. That is way sooner or later every empire has to wrap
them up and leave.
With this new wisdom, let me briefly reflect on a word Goodman uses to
describe the Sri Lankan counterterrorism model, draconian. What is the draconian
model? Is it the model that tries to eradicate terrorism or is it the one that
tries to contain terrorism for prefectural gain.
The numbers speak on my behalf. Thirty years of arm conflict in Sri Lanka
had cost about 70,000 civilian lives. That is for three decades. Look it up on the Uppsala Conflict Encyclopedia. How
many lives have perished in Afghanistan? How many in Iraq? I don’t want to go through
each of US counterterrorism operations. But those numbers amount to millions in
total. And it is continuing. So, Ray Goodman what is the draconian model?
The inevitable peril of US Global War on Terror and its counterterrorism operations
Since the World War II, the US is praised to be the master of
counterterrorism strategy. That is not because all those operations the US
engaged in were successful but because the US is still strong enough to defend
its nation interest as a/the super power. The US is still the super power,
which is strong enough to defend its national interests militarily and
economically in distance corners of the world. That means, according to the US national
interests, none of the military operations, including counterterrorism operations,
have been unsuccessful.
However, since the al Qa’ida is a global phenomenon, and their bases are located
within numerous foreign territories, the US is facing the toughest challenge so
far defending its national interests abroad.
To defeat the al Qa’ida the US has to create favorable conditions within many
foreign territories to eradicate those terrorist elements. Since most of those
states are failed states – and we have lot to do with that too – and
corruptions have taken roots in cores of those state the US sees no easy fixed.
Nation buildings are not in the interest of us – I mean the US.
The US has realised this dilemma its faces in terms of securing its long
term national interest within those states. The US is preparing.
The US has only one realistic option left. Nation buildings are out of the question.
The US could not wrap everything up and come back home for good either. That
would not eliminate the generations of hatred and mess we are leaving there. It
would also be detrimental to the US national interests in those countries and
regions. Surgical strikes seem to be the answer. It is cost effective and the
US has already secured enough logistic capabilities around to do so. Neutralization
of those threats, as they surface in distance territories, could be done
without waging full scale wars.
Those small stationary forces are to enable those logistics and surgical strike
capacities. The modernization of US Army and investments in new technologies
seems to go long way enabling these kinds of counterterrorism operations too.
However, according to my understanding, the US will still be struggling to maintain
this perpetual dilemma of securing its long term national interests and pretending
to be helpful to those nation-states. If you don’t think so, you have not learnt
anything from history.
The perfect condition, which is just enough to temper both sides of the
issues – maintaining the US national interest and the interests of local actors
- cannot be sustained forever. It is becoming costly and less attractive when
other players offer attractive packages to local players.
This perfect equilibrium is impossible to maintain. It is also impossible to
calculate all those complex possibilities surrounding an operation.
Just to give a hint of what these conditions are like, think of the interests
of different global and local actors. These are interconnected now. And then add
the interests of all the neighbouring countries, interests of local actors such
as war lords, actions of non-state actors, interests of the local public and interests
of international communities and multinational organizations as such.
With a different degree of successes and failures, the actions and
reactions of most of these actors might be calculable. But to foresee the
unforeseeable is always impossible.
Here, they lay the enough ingredients for the peril of US counterterrorism
operations. What would the US get at the end of its failure to maintain this
prefect equilibrium is that the whole world – at least a more than half of it –
standing against the US interests abroad. While at the same time, those counter
developments abroad and change in the public perception will be creating an
increased number of radicalized home grown terrorists compromising the US national
security within its own borders. Rising super powers with opposing national interests
to the US would find reassurance in the hands of US immediate neighbours too to
knock the doors at the US border territories.
There is another way out of this inevitable peril of trying to manage the
perfect equilibrium thou. The one that the US plays down the rhetoric a bit and
do actual good in those territories instead while the each US tax payer eventually
pick up a slightly higher bill for fuel prices and so on. That would be the admirable
thing to do. And that is also the right thing to do. That will also leave the
US self proclaimed desire to be the beacon of hope. That would be the legacy the
US left behind, which will be remembered for millennia to come.
Despite those remodernizations of its Army and technological boosts, the US
counterterrorism operations in foreign territories are taunted by the
impossibility of accruing that perfect equilibrium in long term.
The successful Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation
Goodman writes indicting Gotabaya back to the US could somewhat mitigate
the lost the successful Sri Lankan counterterrorism model has done to the US
counterterrorism model.
Goodman tries to politicize the issue in favor of the US interest. The
thing is that there is no issue at stake for the US administration to worry
about at the first place regarding the Sri Lankan model, I have explained
above. If the US administration understands indicting him back to the US would
enhance its nation security strategy and national interests in Sri Lanka and
within that regional, the US administration has gotten it wrong. I make this
argument in the next article.
In this section, I argue the success of the Sri Lankan operation and the
experience of the Sri Lankan Army could instead offer a wealth of new resources
to all the actors involved in counterterrorism operations worldwide.
The strategy which was adopted by the Sri Lankan counterterrorism model exists
as the only winning formula to defeat terrorism within a state.
The Sri Lankan counterterrorism strategy was based on solid principles.
The
first principle of this winning formula is the political will - Gotabaya has
outlined these principles in an article published in Indian Defence Review. (Read:
Lessons from Sri Lanka's War)
Sarath
Fonseka has also confirmed this.
‘It is the political leadership with the
commitment of the military that led the battle to success … And no Defence
Secretary was there like the present Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who had the
same commitment and knowledge on how to crush the LTTE. Finally, they gave me
the chance of going ahead with the military plan.’ (Read: Army Commander assures LTTE is finished)
With a negative spin to it, Goodman has also pointed out that the ‘complete-operational-freedom’,
the sixth principle of Sri Lankan model, had enabled Fonseka to have a ‘rock
solid political backing’ for the operations. Gotabaya had promised Fonseka that
he would take ‘the blame’ on behalf of the Army commanders.
In
a different note, but yet another few significant points have to be made here.
The US’ campaign on the Global War on
Terror had given the strength to the administration of Sri Lanka to defeat the
LTTE. There is a connection between this and the Sri Lankan President’s untainted
political will.
What is remarkable here is to the extent
to which the Sri Lankan administration managed to capitalise on that. It is
never an easy task. It requires faultless calculation of global political
realities and its changing dynamics. It requires an acute knowledge in how to
capitalise on the disfavouring elements in the equilibrium that the US tries to
maintain.
For the readers of this article, it should
come as a no surprise now why the US administration has twisted its official position
towards Sri Lanka aftermath of the war. That is in the US long term interest. Read
the next article.
Coming back to the original point of this section, the Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation
and the US counterterrorism operations could not be compared.
Goodman tries to prey on and try to place the US administration on a
collision path with the Sri Lankan administration.
The principles adopted by the Sri Lankan counterterrorism model offered a decisive
military victory against terrorism.
In that sense, the victory of Sri Lankan Army is of significance to many. The
legitimate governments, their armies, policy researchers and academics could be
direct benefactors of this Sri Lankan experience. The academic disciplines such
as international relations, diplomacy, war studies, counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism studies and studies of post-war developments are all have a great
wealth of knowledge to extract from the Sri Lankan experience. How the
Government of Sri Lanka maintains the diplomatic relations with different
actors prior-to and aftermath-of the military operations, how the actual kinetic
operations were conducted, and what enabled the unprecedented level of post-war
developments in that country shall be in the interest of those disciplines. It
would also be interesting to research what went wrong with the US’s interest in
maintaining the perfect equilibrium in the case of Sri Lanka.
Is the US national interest secured by the US domestic humanitarian law mechanism?
Could it be justified Gotabaya is being brought back to the US to indict because
the Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation was successful?
Is it worth it for the sake of securing US national interests in Sri Lanka and
in that region? Goodman thinks so.
I argue it would be a great mistake if the US administration is taking no
interest in cooperative alliance in Sri Lanka. In terms of shifting US national
security strategy towards Asia, and particular to the South China Sea, Sri
Lanka could be a convenient foothold in Indian Ocean for the US. Diego Garcia is
far too away and far too small in the Indian Ocean to reach the continent for
prompt actions.
Apart from that, politically stable Sri Lanka could be a greater asset to
smoother transactions of the US’ interests through the Exclusives Economic Zone
of Sri Lanka’s in Indian Ocean than politically unstable Sri Lanka. A handful of
the US direct investments will secure this favoring climate in this small
country.
One way or another, Sri Lanka, this tiny island nation of Sri Lanka, would
never ever be in a position to threaten any of the US’s geographical interests
in that region. So, why does the US do ill in that country when very little
good could achieve the same and much more? The argument here is a little of good
deed could go long way in this small island. China is also doing that. China is
doing that not only in Sri Lanka but also in India, Pakistan and elsewhere too.
It seems like it is not much of an argument. But this argument has its own
gravity. This argument lies in the middle of where the US has to make a
decision regarding Sri Lanka whether the US administration likes to maintain
its classical perfect equilibrium in Sri Lanka or follow the other path. I
would like to see the US is following the latter path in Sri Lanka.
As I have outlined in the previous articles, the operations were conducted by
the Sri Lankan Army within the thresholds of humanitarian principles. There are
a wealth of facts available outlining every aspect of the factual realities in
the final phase of the operation.
The incidents which seem to raise eyebrows are very few in number, and insignificant
in comparison to the total humanitarian nature of the operations. If you wish
to keep stressing on those few incidents in the final phase you should first
look at into your own history - that is if you have a nation-state. Look into
the creation of the US as a nation-state or any other nation-states in that
matter. I am not saying that because they did we could do it too. What I am saying is that it has to be looked
through the contextual basis and on the foundation of utility for the majority
of Sri Lankan.
In trying to favor the US interests in Sri Lanka Goodman has undermined
himself as a professor of law. He mingles humanitarian law with the US national
interests. I would say it would be quite okay to do so for the right reasons. But
Sri Lanka is a wrong place to go after when so much evidence is available to
prove the humanitarian nature of the Sri Lankan counterterrorism operation.
Goodman has to know the following:
In history, victors of war were never kept accountable for wining their wars.
The norms of humanitarian law always were behind that classic practice. The
legitimacy of law derives from the power of the victors not from the shame of
losers.
That is why we recall the Nazis for their gruesome crimes. The nuclear
victim of Japan is recalled for her expansionist attitude.
The victors of World War II, the US, the UK and the rest, are praised for
getting rid evils off the planet and saving humanity. Neither the post-war
justice delivered aftermaths of World War I nor the Napoleonic wars contradict
that wisdom.
The contemporary international legal system is widely perceived as a something
else, a something from bottom up, especially since the international
community’s involvement in Rwanda and in former Yugoslavia.
In reality, nothing has changed. The aspirations of small nations are, of
cause, sometimes reflect in these developments. But they never surpass the
aspirations of powerful. The Security Council is the living testimony for that.
They are the authority which gives legitimacy to international public law. Those
institutions, like ICC, are not there to go beyond than conserving the
interests of those powerful nation-states.
The international public law is a tool of maintaining conservative
international peace and security. It is ideally to conserve the perfect
equilibrium.
The question of what then keeps the Sri Lankan authorities away from these
politicized international criminal investigations is also a good example of the
dynamics of that equilibrium.
Those who wish to see any changes in this status-quo shall praise the Sri
Lankan authorities for the successful conduct of counterterrorism operation instead
of the annual bashing of the administration.
Concluding remarks
Goodman argues it is in the best interests of the US to indict Gotabaya
back to the US using the domestic legal avenues available. He creates an unnecessary
fear that the Sri Lankan counterterrorism model poses a threat to the US
counterterrorism model.
Goodman has made that statement very lightly.
I have argued above these counterterrorism models could not be compared.
The US counterterrorism operations, which conducted on foreign territories,
battle with a unique dilemma, a task of maintaining a perfect equilibrium. Each
of the US operation has to secure the US national interests while it has to help
out a foreign sovereign to establish the necessary conditions to eradicate
terrorist elements within that sovereign.
The US national interest is fundamentally at odd with helping out foreign
sovereigns.
However, even if the US administration thinks they have a chance of
maintaining a perfect equilibrium in long run, each operation is destined to
fail because of complex conditions surrounding these operations are unable to
fully comprehend.
The Sri Lankan authority did not conduct a foreign counterterrorism operation.
Its untainted political will helped to defeat terrorism from its soil. I have argued,
the Sri Lankan counterterrorism model is the only model available to defeat
terrorism within a state.
Indicting Gotabaya back to the US will have counterproductive effects to
the US national interests in Sri Lanka. I will argue Sri Lanka could be a great
foothold to the US to secure its national security strategy of
Pivot to Asia in
the next article.
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